Ozaukee County's
War History
by Daniel E. McGinley

as extracted from THE PORT WASHINGTON STAR
April 3, 1897



Co. H, 24th Wisconsin
Chapter 10

That was a weary march from Franklin to Nashville, on the morning of December 1, 1864, by the tired troops of Schofield's little army. From the 28th of November, but few of the command had had much rest and less sleep, the brigade to which the Twenty-fourth belonged having had very little of either, and our heroic boys reached Nashville in an exhausted condition, many of them being hardly able to stand or walk. It was late in the day when the last of Schofield's force had been placed in the lines of fortifications which surrounded the city, and that night strict attention was paid to sleep by all but the few unfortunates who had to stand guard.

By the evening of Dec. 1st, Gen. Thomas found himself at the head of an army, encamped in and around Nashville, which far outnumbered that of his adversary, but a number of his troops were merely clerks from the quartermaster's department, who had been armed and drilled but a few days while many more were new troops just from home, and the cool, careful "Rock of Chickamauga" made up his mind to be well prepared before he assumed the offensive.

Gen. Hood found himself in a serious position after his repulse and great loss at Franklin. His army was so badly crippled that it was almost madness to advance further, but he had penetrated so far into the territory lately held by the Union army, that to retreat from it without serious loss of men and prestige was doubtless an impossibility, and he determined to continue the advance and the offensive. After burying the dead and caring for the wounded at Franklin, his army crossed the Harpeth and followed Schofield to Nashville, and on the night of Dec. 1st began to deploy and intrench in front of Thomas' lines.

According to the best estimates (there were no official reports of its strength), Hood had still 44,000 veterans in his command. They were all veterans but the disheartening results of the late campaigns, and the heavy losses at Franklin, had almost demoralized some of their organizations and caused the remainder to be doubtful of any future success. Jeff Davis, Beauregard, Hood and other leaders had promised them that when they entered Tennessee, the residents of that state would flock to their standard by the thousands, but they had seen none of the "flocking." A few hundred sympathizing Tennesseans had joined them, but the great majority were loyal to the old flag or were bright enough to see that the end was approaching, and that the rebellion was a gigantic failure.

The authorities at Washington and Gen. Grant, who had been anxiously watching the Nashville campaign, were all of the opinion that Thomas now having a larger army than his opponent, should assume the offensive at once, and drive Hood out of Tennessee. But Thomas did not think that his army was ready for such a movement until Dec. 8th, and then a terrible storm of snow and sleet set in, and lasting two or three days covered the ground with a sheet of ice, which made it utterly impracticable to move the army. Telegram after telegram came from the east urging, imploring and commanding Thomas to move against Hood, but "Old Pap," as the boys called him, answered that he felt compelled to wait until the storm ceased and the ice melted. Gen. Grant, not realizing the real condition of the ice covered hills around Nashville, ordered Gen. John A. Logan, who happened to be in Washington at the time to proceed to Nashville as quickly as possible, and relieve Thomas of his command. Gen. Logan started promptly and reached Louisville, Ky. as the news came of Thomasí first day's victory, and waiting there for further orders, was recalled to Washington. In the meantime, the cold weather and ice had caused great suffering in the lines of the opposing armies, particularly among the rebel troops, many of whom were without shoes or sufficient clothing.

At length on the 14th of December, a warm rain set in which melted the ice, and preparations were made to attack the rebel army the next day. On the morning of the 15th, the ice had given way to deep mud, and the movements of the Union troops were necessarily quite slow, but providentially a heavy fog hung over the field during the morning and obscured the early movements of Thomas' army. The two armies having lain facing each other and in close proximity during the two weeks of preparation and waiting, had indulged in the usual skirmishing, and Hood had sent strong detachments to attack the small posts along the railroad south of Nashville which had more often met defeat than success. When the battle began, detachments of Hood's army were absent on such errands, and could not return in time to assist their unfortunate comrades.

Hood's army had not been large enough to invest the whole line of Thomas' fortifications, which extended from the river above to rejoin it below the town, Nashville being like Franklin in a bend of the stream. Hood's left being "in air" and much exposed, Thomasí plan of battle was to make a feint against Hood's right, and then swing the right of his own army so as to take Hood's left in the flank and roll it up. The plan was rigidly carried out and worked like a charm.

Since the wounding of Major McArthur at Franklin, Capt. E. B. Parsons had commanded the Twenty-fourth and led it through the battle of Nashville. The position of the regiment in the battle was near the right centre of Thomas' line. Gen. W. L. Elliot had superseded the unfortunate Gen. Wagner in the command of the division, and it was handled with more ability than at Franklin. The division joined the left of the Sixteenth corps, which was the right of Thomas' infantry line, and Elliot's boys were in a position to take the rebel line squarely in the flank. In his "Franklin and Nashville," Gen. Cox gives the following description of the battle-field:

"Standing in the salient in Wood's line, the topography of the country about Nashville is clearly seen. On the left, towards the east, is a valley in which Brown's Creek flows north into the Cumberland. It rises in the high Brentwood Hills, which shut out the view toward the south a little more than four miles away; and its course is nearly parallel to the eastern line of Thomasí intrenchments. On the right, but a little farther off, is Richland Creek, flowing northwest into the Cumberland. It rises also in the Brentwood Hills, not more than a mile west of Brown's Creek, and runs nearly parallel with it toward the city for some distance, when the two curve away to right and left encircling the place, and marking its strong and natural line of defense. On the high ridge between the creeks is the Granny White turnpike. A mile eastward is the Franklin turnpike, diverging about thirty degrees. At nearly equal distances on that side, the Nolensville and Murfreesboro turnpikes leave the city successively. Turning toward the west from our station the Hillsboro, the Hardin and the Charlotte turnpikes successively go out at similar angles, all radiating from the centre of the town. The ground is hilly, rising in knobs, and eminences two or three hundred feet above the Cumberland, but mostly open, with groves of timber here and there. Hood's line was over Brown's Creek, on the high ground from the Nolensville turnpike and the Chattanooga railway to the Franklin turnpike, then crossing the creek and mounting a high hill west of it, it extended to the Hillsboro road, where it turned back along a stone wall on the side of the turnpike. His main line at his left, where it reached the Hillsboro pike, was about a mile in front of wood (4th corps), but he also occupied an advanced line with skirmishers; only half that distance away, and terminating in a strong outpost on Montgomery Hill, at the Hillsboro road."

At six o'clock in the morning, Gen. Steedman, who had won undying fame at Chickamauga, moved out on the Murfreesboro pike under the cover of the fog, and attacked Hood's right with great vigor, making a roar of artillery and rattle of small arms that immediately attracted Hood's attention and drew it away from the point of real danger at his left. The distance the right of the Sixteenth corps had to travel was greater than had been reckoned on, and it was ten o'clock before the fighting was begun in good earnest.

In a very short time, the rebel cavalry under Gen. Chalmers, which had been guarding Hood's left, was going to the rear on the run, closely pursued by the Union cavalry under Gen. Wilson, and Chalmersí wagon train and headquarters were quickly captured. A number of detached redoubts, in which artillery was mounted, were stormed, some by the infantry and others by the cavalry, which dismounted and acted as infantry when such places were reached. Nothing retarded the onward sweep of Thomasí right, and by the middle of the afternoon, the Sixteenth corps, supported by a part of the Fourth and Twenty-third, attacked and carried the enemy's position on the Hillsboro road, sending the defenders toward the centre and rear of Hood's position in a disorganized mass.

It was one o'clock P.M. before Elliott's division got into the fight, it with the remainder of the Fourth corps having had to wait until the Sixteenth got abreast of it in the general wheel. When it did start, the Fourth corps had lively fighting to do, but it pressed forward, sweeping everything before it until darkness put an end to the fighting for the day. Elliott's division gallantly assisted in carrying the stone wall at the Hillsboro pike, capturing guns and crushing Hood's left completely.

The glorious results of the first day's battle were obtained with astonishing light losses on the Union side, the loss of the whole army being but seven or eight hundred killed or wounded. Sixteen pieces of artillery and 1,200 prisoners had been captured, and Hood's whole army had been driven back fully two miles. It is needless to say that the Union troops were jubilant, and went to sleep on their arms confident of another victory on the morrow.

Hood now realizing the danger which threatened him and his army, worked a greater part of the night reforming his broken lines in a new position; and his poorly fed and clothed troops labored diligently through the night erecting fortifications, much of their work being done under the fire of the Union lines which intrenched themselves temporarily for the night. There were gloomy scenes and forebodings in the bivouacks of the rebel army that night, but the following and many succeeding nights were destined to be worse. One cannot look back to that time and place without a deep feeling of pity for the brave but misguided men who composed Hood's army. The world will never know and cannot imagine the depth of their misery; but they were soldiers who had been tried through months and years of campaigns, in which they had become hardened, and many arose on the morning of the 16th of December, 1864, determined to sell their lives as dearly as possible in defense of their ěcause.î But a great many of the officers and men of that army had become completely disheartened, and when the crises came on the second day, were not equal to the emergency -- were not able to cope with the determined and enthusiastic Union troops. The small losses sustained by Thomasí army on both days, the confusion and precipitation of the retreat, abandoning trains and artillery, tells of a state of discontent and demoralization that has seldom been equaled in a modern army.

The Union army was up and in line at dawn on the second day, ready and eager for the fray; and commanders busied themselves in making preparations for a struggle which was to end in the destruction of a great army -- the most rushing defeat of the war, up to that time.