Ozaukee County's
War History
by Daniel E. McGinley

as extracted from THE PORT WASHINGTON STAR
July 24, 1897



26th Wisconsin
Chapter 6

In a short time, the infantry that had been out on Sickles' reconnoitering expedition and which had been hastily ordered to return when the disaster to his right became known at Hooker's headquarters, reached Hazel Grove, and forming in line drove the rebels from that part of the field. Hamlin makes light of the operations on that part of our lines after the return of our infantry, but the fact remains that a large number of our men were killed and wounded there. That there was considerable confusion in the ranks of the opposing troops in and around the woods west of Chancellor House that night, and that there were occasions when troops were fired into by their friends, are facts which have not been denied; but when we are asked to believe that nearly all of the firing there that night was the result of false alarms and mistaken identity, and that nearly all who fell on our side were the victims of mistakes on the part of their friends, we must answer that there has not been enough proof advanced to substantiate such statements. That there were false alarms and mistakes on both sides in the darkness and confusion, there is no doubt; neither is there any doubt but that there was some spirited and legitimate fighting on different parts of the field after darkness enveloped the scene.

But the fight with the Eleventh Corps had badly crippled Jackson's superb army; and that night, it met a very severe loss by the wounding of its daring and able leader. The battle had not gone as well with his command as the great flanker had expected. His orders and instructions had not been obeyed nor followed in all cases, and some of his subordinates had come in for some sharp criticisms, especially Gen. Colquitt, who commanded a brigade on the right of Jackson's line, and by a vexatious error, delayed seventeen regiments for nearly an hour. When the Eleventh Corps had been driven from its last position on the Dowall farm, Jackson had ordered his men to press forward in pursuit, but Colston and Rodes, who commanded his two front lines of battle, urged a halt, claiming that their men were too much exhausted by the long march, the lack of food, and the desperate fighting, to advance further. Jackson reluctantly ordered a halt, he believing that one more effort would place his troops in the open field in the rear of the Chancellor House, and in command of the only road by which a large part of Hooker's army could escape. Gen. Colston wrote long years after, that the halt was not a mistake but a necessity, and this statement was undoubtedly true.

Jackson ordered Hill's division, which it will be remembered formed his third line of battle up to that time, to march to the front and prepare for a night attack, while Colston and Rodes were directed to reorganize their shattered divisions in its rear. While this was being done, Jackson took possession of Howard's late headquarters at the Dowall Tavern, where he chafed under the delay until after 9 P.M., when he again mounted and rode to the front. About half way through the forest west of the Chancellor House, Jackson found the advance brigade of Hill's division, Lane's Carolinians, deployed on either side of the Plank road and facing the new Union line, then in the eastern edge of the forest. It was while he was reconnoitering in front of the left of this brigade, attended by a few officers, that Jackson received his death wounds. Every officer in the group was either killed or wounded, and the rebel chieftain was struck by three rifle balls. In spite of his terrible wounds, Jackson kept his seat in the saddle, and when Old Sorrel, frightened by the firing, dashed toward the Union lines, he brought him under control and turned him toward his own lines, where he was lifted from the saddle and laid under a tree. He was finally conveyed to the rear under a tempest of shot and shell from he Union batteries, which made sad havoc in his lines, and one of his brigade commanders, expressing a doubt of his ability to hold his brigade under that murderous fire, the dying chieftain gave his last order, saying emphatically: "Pender, you must hold your ground!" Gen. Hill was wounded by this artillery fire, and the rebel advance ended for the day. Gen. Jackson died eight days later. His death was the result of his own rashness, and was a most fortunate occurrence for the cause of the Union.

With Jackson died the prestige of his famous corps. The "cowardly Dutchmen" fired with such precision and fought with such determination on that eventful 2nd of May at Chancellorsville that, as Hamlin says: "When the shot-torn flags of Jackson's corps were planted in triumph on the crest of Fairview at 9 o'clock on Sunday morning, May 3, 1864, the culminating point of its daring and strength had passed, never to return. The South could not replace the host of dauntless men who went down in that determined and desperate struggle."

At or shortly before midnight, the fighting ceased and both armies rested on their arms or made preparations for the struggle which they felt certain would occur on the morrow. The survivors of the Twenty-sixth, like the majority of their corps, got little sleep or rest that night, as they changed positions several times during the night, and the morning of the 3rd found them feeling very weary and sad after the eventful evening and night. Many of their comrades were missing, and the greatest anxiety was felt in regard to their fate. As they afterwards learned, scores of the missing were sleeping their eternal sleep on the now historic farms of Talley, Hawkins and Dowall, hundreds more were still lying there sorely wounded. Many others who had become separated from their commands in the confusion of the retreat, rejoined their comrades the next day; while there are others whose fate has remained a mystery to this day.

Before daylight on the 3rd, the survivors of the Eleventh Corps fell in line, and were marched north toward the Rappahannock, where the corps was formed in line on the extreme left of the army, and facing south. Here it remained during the battle of that day, and was not hotly engaged at any time. The battle of Sunday, May 3rd, was as full of blunders and poor generalship on the Union side as that of the previous day had been, but it was not marked with such a signal disaster as had befallen the Eleventh Corps on the 2nd. Hooker fully demonstrated the fact on the 3rd that he was utterly unfit to command a large army in battle. The Second, Third and Twelfth corps fought the battle of the second day under great disadvantages, while over 27,000 men of the First, Fifth and Eleventh corps looked on as spectators and scarcely fired a shot. History tells the shameful story that Hooker's great army was again defeated on that day, while 27,000 men eager to rush to the assistance of their comrades were not allowed to participate in the action. Just think of it, here was an army suffering a defeat, while it had a fresh reserve of 27,000 veterans looking on -- nearly as many men as Lee was using that day to crush Hooker! Oh, that a Grant, a Sherman, a Sheridan or a Logan directed the Union army at Chancellorsville that day! Had it been so, a glorious victory would have been won for the Union. The battle of Gettysburg would never have been fought! Lee would have received such a crushing defeat at Chancellorsville that he would never thereafter dream of assuming the offensive and undertaking such an expedition as the one that reached the "High Water Mark" at Gettysburg. The war should have been shortened by at least a year, and thousands of precious lives and property valued into the billions would have been saved.

But there was no Grant, no Sherman, no Sheridan nor a Logan in command -- only an unnerved, incompetent Hooker, and therefore history has to tell of a disgraceful defeat to the Union arms.

We will let the good comrade of the Twenty-sixth, from whose notes I have previously quoted, tell something of the part his regiment took in the second day's battle. He says: "That morning we marched about two miles to the left and halted on a heighth which commanded a broad field to the southward. This was a very strong position and in our vicinity were placed upward of thirty cannon, all of which could rake the field in front, besides there was a double line of riflepits lined with infantry. Most of our regiment was sent out on the skirmish line, my company among the number. Our line was about 80 rods in front of the fortifications, just in the edge of the woods. Here we passed some time listening to the roar of artillery only a mile or so distant to our right. For about three hours that morning, there was a continual roar in that direction. After noon, the firing slackened somewhat, but still continued at intervals. During the day, there were several reconnaissances in the pine woods to our front, and some little firing as our cavalry encountered the rebel skirmishers."

"Between three and four o'clock, we could hear the rebel officers giving commands only a short distance from us in the woods, but we could not see them, and our lieutenant, who was further to the right with a fieldglass, assured us that they were coming. We knelt down and came to a ìreadyî in order to give them a warm reception when they came. Some of boys to the left caught a glimpse of the rebel line and fired, and our whole skirmish line fired into the bushes. The enemy did not like this kind of a reception, and marched by the left flank into a jog in the clearing, evidently trying to outflank us, but we also changed our position and kept them at bay. Some of our boys took position in a house which gave them a fine view of the adjoining fields, from whence they fired several vollies. I got into a summer house in the garden, from which I had several good shots at them. I had quite a duel with one of the rebs who seemed to be lying flat on the ground about 120 rods distant, and finally 'silenced his battery.' At length, we set fire to the house in order to prevent the rebs from taking possession of it when we fell back as we were ordered to do. It was now quite dark but the burning house made our vicinity nearly as light as day. We skulked along in the shadows until we took up our old position. Here we hugged the ground listening to an occasional bullet whiz over us until we were relieved about 10 P.M. We then marched back to the main line on the hill, and lying down, were soon fast asleep."

The losses sustained by the Eleventh Corps in the hour and a half that it fought Jackson's whole army on the evening of that eventful 2nd of May, were very heavy, and showed how gallantly the men of that corps defended their colors. Of the less than 9,000 men engaged over 2,600 were missing, over 1,600 of whom were killed or wounded. The Twenty-sixth Wisconsin had 471 men in line that evening, and in twenty minutes, lost 54 killed or mortally wounded. Company G, the Washington county company being on the left of the regiment and much nearer the rebel line than the right, suffered the heaviest loss of any of the companies, its killed and mortally wounded numbering 121.

Of the Ozaukee boys in the Twenty-sixth, John Lau, of Mequon, was killed; Fred Nero, of the same town was mortally wounded, he dying of the wound at Washington, June 14, 1863. John Grundke, of Cedarburg, and Wm. Baetz, of Mequon, were wounded and left on the field. One of the bones of Grundke's right leg was shattered by a bullet, crippling him for life. Both he and Baetz were soon exchanged, and Baetz recovered from his wound and returned to the regiment. Chas. Beckman, of Mequon, and John Graff, of Fredonia, were wounded; and Wm. Maetzold, of Cedarburg, was taken prisoner, but was exchanged and returned to the regiment. Beckman and Graff recovered in time and rejoined their company.