Ozaukee County's
War History
by Daniel E. McGinley

as extracted from THE PORT WASHINGTON STAR
June 26, 1897



26th Wisconsin
Chapter 2

The Twenty-Sixth Wisconsin Burn side's ill-fated "mud Campaign" routed the Eleventh Corps out of its comfortable quarters on the 19th of January, 1863. The corps marched to the neighborhood of Beriah Church that day, but the Twenty-sixth being the rear-guard remained in the camp a few days and then joined the corps at the Church. It is needless to give the result of this campaign. It was rain, rain for several days, and the roads, plowed up by the marching army, became a veritable sea of mud, through which it was almost impossible to move the teams and artillery; and even the troops found personal locomotion next to impossible.

On the 4th of February, just when the Eleventh Corps had nearly finished comfortable winter quarters, marching orders came, and it traveled back through a bad snow storm, nearly to its old camp at Stafford Court House. Here it again built winter quarters, and the boys concluded that there must be a conspiracy against them to make them build quarters for all the rest of the army. But this time they were allowed to remain in and enjoy their new camp when they had it completed. The remainder of the winter was passed here in drilling, and performing camp and picket duties, and in being well instructed in the "school of the soldier."

The strength of the Twenty-sixth had been so greatly reduced through sickness, death and discharges, that its aggregate number of officers and men present and fit for duty was about 700 at the commencement of the Chancellorsville campaign. Lieut. Col. Lehman resigned Jan. 16, 1863, and Capt. Hans Boebel, of Co. H, was promoted to fill the vacancy. Being thus "jumped" by the promotion of Capt. Boebel, Major Horwitz resigned on the 5th of February, and Capt. Henry Baetz, of Co. F, was commissioned Major on the 15th of March. The first death in the regiment was that of Heinrich Jaeger, of Co. A, which occurred from disease at Centreville, Nov. 30, 1862. After that there were a number of deaths during the winter and spring. Of the Ozaukee boys Peter Hoffranz, of Port Washington, died in hospital of disease, at Stafford Court House, Febr. 20, 1863. Hugo Boclo, of Cedarburg who had been serving as Hospital Steward of the regiment was discharged Jan. 11, 1863, for a disability of which he died in Cedarburg thirty-four years later. Edward Schoenfeld, of Port Washington, was discharged for disability, Mar. 21, 1863.

Gen. Burnside having acknowledged, like the true nobleman of nature that he was, that he lacked the ability to command the Army of the Potomac, and requested that he be relieved of the command, Gen. Joseph Hooker - "fighting Joe Hooker," as he was familiarly known to the Union troops, - was selected for the position. Having recovered from the effects of the blunder at Fredericksburg, the magnificent Army of the Potomac was in fine trim to open the campaign in the spring of 1863. Brave, strong, well drilled, and confident, there was but one reason why that grand army did not gain a magnificent victory in the Chancellorsville campaign, and that was the lack of ability in and mutual esteem among its leading generals. Probably no army ever entered upon a campaign in which there were more incompetent leaders, and in which there was more bickering and jealousy, than in the Army of the Potomac when it entered upon the Chancellorsville campaign. And the consequence was that although the troops were in splendid spirits and magnificently equipped, the battle was lost, and thousands of the flower of the Northland went down before the guns of the rebels, a sacrifice to the incompetency and jealousy of some of their leaders. There were many good, brave and competent leaders in that unfortunate army; but there were some that should never have been given the command of a regiment, let alone that of the corps or division which they led to the slaughter on that field of blunders and disasters.

Early in April preparations began for the campaign, and on the 27th of that month Hooker's great army of 120,000 men broke camp to begin one of the most lamentable of the campaigns of the war. Across the Rappahannock Gen. Lee was holding Fredericksburg and the adjacent country with an army which has been variously estimated at from 55,000 to 75,000 men. Thus we see that Hooker had nearly if not quite twice as many men as Lee, and granting that Lee had the advantage of fighting on the defensive and on ground of his own choice, and with every mile of which he was familiar, which advantages were worth thousands of men to him, still judging from the numbers, Hooker should have won a complete victory.

On the other hand, Lee's army was at this time nearly all an army of volunteers, and was composed of the best men of the South. They believed and boasted that they carried with them not only the flag, but the glory and very life of the so-called Confederacy. "Both armies," writes Hamlin in his "Chancellorsville," "moved to the front with great confidence. The Federal army felt secure and strong in its superior numbers, its splendid equipment, its devotion and its enthusiasm. The Confederate army, strengthened by the conscription act, and stimulated by the long winter's rest, also felt invincible under the guidance of its trusty leaders."

Gen. O. O. Howard, a very unfortunate selection, had superceded Gen. Sigel in the command of the Eleventh Corps. and under his leadership it entered the campaign. This corps was at this time formed of a large part of the forces which had previously served Freemont and Sigel in Western Virginia and the Shenandoah Valley, to which had later been added a few new regiments, our Twenty-sixth Wisconsin among the number. The veterans of the corps had fought in Western Virginia, in the Shenandoah, and in the campaign under Gen. Pope, ending with the second battle of Bull Run. It now consisted of twenty-seven regiments of infantry and six batteries of artillery, numbering about 11,000 effectives. Sixteen of those regiments were tried veterans, and the remaining eleven had seen considerable service, but had not been under fire. Besides the advent of Gen. Howard to the command of the corps, there had been several unfortunate changes in the commanders of divisions and brigades in the corps, which caused a good deal of dissatisfaction and discontent among the rank and file at this time. Lincoln's famous maxim "never swap horses while crossing a stream," was utterly disregarded in the Army of the Potomac at this period, and greatly to its disadvantage, as the sequel shows. The Eleventh Corps was reckoned as a German corps, but a large majority of the regiments composing it had, like our Twenty-sixth, many men of other nationalities, and it is safe to say that a large majority of the members of the corps were Americans by birth.

Nevertheless a majority of the Eleventh Corps being of German birth or parentage, it was known as a German corps; and notwithstanding that it was, through the blunders and incompetency of those high in command, placed in a trap, fearfully cut up and accused of cowardice at Chancellorsville, it became one of the most reliable and efficient bodies of troops in the Union armies, and made a proud record before the war ended.

Commencing its history with Blenker's brigade at Bull Run, it helped win the first victories in Western Virginia, fought its way through the Shenandoah Valley and over the mountains to the second Manassas; fought heroically at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, and then hurrying west to the relief of Chattanooga and Knoxville, it won fresh laurels in the Atlanta campaign, bore its banner proudly in the march to the sea, and through the Carolinas; hurled back Johnston's veterans at Averysboro and again at Bentonville, and showed at every stage of its existence that it had valiant men in its ranks, who were not afraid "to do and to die for the Eternal Right!" It was no fault of the rank and file of this corps that it was driven in disorder from its first position at Chancellorsville. Gen. Doubleday, in his "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," writes in regard to this point: "I assert that when a force is not deployed, but is struck suddenly and violently on its flank, resistance is impractiable. Not Napoleon's Old Guard, not the best and bravest troops that ever existed, could hold together in such a case, for the first men assailed are - to use a homely but expressive word - driven into a huddle, and a huddle cannot fight, for it has not front and no organization."

Striking its tents on the morning of April 27th, our Twenty-sixth accompanied the movements of the corps, and by two o'clock P.M., on the succeeding day reached Kelley's Ford on the Rappahannock. By midnight a pontoon bridge was completed, and the Eleventh Corps crossed the river, marched three miles further and bivouacked until morning. On the 29th the Twelfth Corps took the lead and was followed by the Eleventh. About 5 o'clock that afternoon the column reached the Rapidan at Germanna Ford, and the Eleventh Corps pitched its tents, supposing it would remain there until morning. But the boys had hardly fallen asleep when orders came to pack up and move forward immediately. Hurriedly obeying the orders, the corps crossed the Rapidan on a temporary bridge, lighted by flickering rays of a guard's fire, and bivouacked on the farther shore. Soon after daybreak it was again on the march, and tramping through heat and dust reached Locust Grove, near Chancellorsville, about 4 o'clock P.M.

In the meantime Gen. Lee had been watching his adversary's movements, and made no effort to prevent him from crossing the rivers, preferring, it is said, to meet him in the wilderness which nearly covered the country in the vicinity of Chancellorsville. Leaving Gen. Early's division to hold Marye's Heighths at Fredericksburg, Lee marched the rest of his army to a position two miles south of Chancellorsville and entrenched it on a line more than three miles in length, extending from the Rappahannock southwesterly to the Massaponax creek. Here on the evening of April 30th Hooker's head of column found the enemy. Skirmishing began, and as the different divisions came up they were deployed between the rebels' position and the Chancellor House.

In Lee's immediate front the country was much broken, and was covered by a dense forest. To attack Lee in that position Hooker's army would be forced to fight under great disadvantages. Therefore, on the following day, May 1st, Hooker ordered the different corps of his army to form in a selected position around Chancellorsville, and to entrench their lines, determining to act on the defensive until he had heard from Sedgewick, whom he had sent with a strong force to attack Early at Fredericksburg. If from Marye's Heighths, Lee's army would be between two fires, and might expect rough handling. But by the time Sedgewick's men had planted Old Glory in triumph on the famous Heighths, which they did by a brilliant assault, led by the fighting Fifth Wisconsin under the command of its gallant Colonel Tom Allen, on the 3rd of May, the battle of Chancellorsville had been fought and lost. Lee and Jackson had been too quick for Hooker.

Hooker's position at Chancellorsville was principally in small clearings. The Fifth Corps formed the left of the line, facing southeast, its right reaching the White House nearly a mile north of Chancellor's. The Second Corps came next, facing east, its right resting on the pike near Chancellor's. On its right was the Twelfth Corps facing south, its line sweeping around Fairview and reaching Hazel Grove, where Briney's division of the Third Corps was stationed, the other divisions of that corps being massed in reserve north of the Chancellor House and in the rear of the Second Corps. On the right of Birney's division the Eleventh Corps lay facing south, the greater portion of its line being in clearings on the farms of Dowall and Talley. Steinwehr's division formed the left of the corps, Schurz's the center, and Devens' the right. The latter division was stationed along the pike running west from Chancellorsville two miles away, its right "in air," or unsupported, in the timber west of Talley's farm, and two regiments at the right of the line were formed at right angles with the main line and facing west. The corps had thrown up light breastworks, but no elaborate or heavy entrenchments were undertaken.

The Twenty-sixth Wisconsin was given a position in the second or supporting line of its brigade, and enjoyed a short rest, which was broken at one time during the day by a rebel battery that threw some shells into that part of the line, "feeling" the Union position, but our batteries did not answer. On the left center of the Union line there was considerable artillery firing and some skirmishing that day, the enemy trying to learn the exact position of the Union army.

The eventful 2nd of May, 1863, dawned upon a superb and confident army of boys in blue, drawn up in battle array around Chancellorsville. What a glorious morning and what a sad evening that day had for the cause of freedom! At about 10 o'clock A.M. the brigade to which the Twenty-sixth belonged, was taken from its position in the main line, and formed in a clearing on Hawkin's farm, to the right rear of the remainder of the division and facing west. The Twenty-sixth was on the right of this disconnected line, formed in column in the open field, with a heavy timber 80 rods in front. In this timber and about 300 yards from the regiment, a line of skirmishers was deployed with companies "A" and "B" for a support.